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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Appellee/ i 
V« \ 
DAN A. PARK, i 
Defendant-Appellant. J 
t Case No. 900260-CA 
i Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from two convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine and marijuana, a third 
degree felony and a class A misdemeanor, respectively, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann- S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did defendant preserve for appellate review the 
issue of whether there was "probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant and [his] vehicle after the 
roadblock stop?M 
2. Did defendant preserve for appellate review the 
issue of whether defendant's consent to search was voluntary? 
Where defendant has failed to raise an issue below, he 
has waived consideration of it on appeal. State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985). 
3. Did the trial court properly exercise its 
discretion in denying defendant's motions to dismiss and for a 
directed verdict? 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss or a 
motion for directed verdict, the standard is whether the state 
presented some evidence to establish each element of the crimes 
charged. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Dan A. Park, was charged on May 10, 1989, 
with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent 
to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990), and possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990) (R. 
5). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence 
(R. 25-26). An evidentiary hearing was held on August 1, 1989, 
and the matter taken under advisement to allow for the filing of 
supporting memoranda (R. 28, 29-35, 36-48). On October 17, 1989, 
the court denied the motion in a written ruling (R. 49-56). 
The Controlled Substances Act has had various amendments since 
1989, the date of defendant's offense. However, since none of 
the provisions applicable here were amended, all statutory 
references will be to the current statute. 
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On January 22, 1990/ a jury trial was held before the 
Honorable Boyd M. Park, Fourth Judicial District Court, Juab 
County, Utah (R. 104-05). Guilty verdicts were returned on the 
lesser included offense of possession of marijuana, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1990), and possession of methamphetamine, as charged (R. 
102-03). On April 6, 1990, defendant was sentenced to the 
statutory terms of imprisonment, to run concurrently. The 
execution of the sentences was suspended and defendant was placed 
on probation under specified terms and conditions (R. 109-11). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 10, 1990, the Utah Highway Patrol, in connection 
with the Juab County Sheriff, Utah County Sheriff, Sevier County 
Sheriff, Alpine City Police, Orem City Police, Pleasant Grove 
City Police, American Fork City Police and Lehi City Police 
Departments, conducted a roadblock two miles south of Nephi, 
Utah, on the 1-15 highway (R. 138, 148).2 Notice of the 
potential roadblock had been published in the Juab County Times 
News and the Provo City Daily Herald newspapers some one to two 
weeks previously (R. 139, 146, 243-44). 
The roadblock was supervised by the Utah Highway 
Patrol, with the assistance of the Juab County Sheriff's Office 
(R. 147, 164). Prior to the on-site training, classroom sessions 
The record on appeal consists of the district court record and 
two volumes of transcripts, one of the suppression hearing and 
one of the trial. The district court clerk's office has 
separately paged the transcripts as a continuation of the record. 
Therefore, the transcript cites will be referred to as marked, 
that is, (R. — ). 
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had been held (R. 165). Approximately thirty (30) to thirty-five 
(35) officers were present at the roadblock, with half stopping 
northbound traffic and half stopping southbound traffic. On each 
side of the highway, three four-by-four foot orange signs were 
posted to warn motorists of the stop (R. 148). All north and 
southbound traffic was stopped with the exception of commercial 
buses and semi-trailers (R. 149). The drivers of all personal 
vehicles were required to produce their driver's license, vehicle 
registration and proof of insurance (R. 150-51). The roadblock 
lasted approximately five hours (R. 140, 162). 
One hour after the roadblock commenced, at 
approximately 8:15 a.m., defendant drove his vehicle to the 
roadblock (R. 139, 235). Defendant's brother, David Park, was 
seated in the passenger's right front seat and a friend, Gerald 
Hewlett, was seated in the rear (R. 140, 142). Consistent with 
the stops of all other vehicles at the roadblock, Deputy LuWayne 
Walker, a Juab County deputy sheriff, approached defendant's 
vehicle. When the deputy bent down to the defendant's window to 
converse, he noticed a burnt odor inside the vehicle (R. 140, 
154). The officer asked defendant to produce his driver's 
license and vehicle registration, which defendant did (R. 140). 
The deputy noted that defendant acted differently from the other 
individuals stopped during the roadblock. The officer thought 
that he might have been "on something" (R. 140). At trial, 
defendant admitted that he had taken a pain killer that morning 
and was extremely nervous in entering the roadblock based on a 
prior bad experience with the police (R. 261, 268). 
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Deputy Walker asked defendant if he was carrying any 
alcohol, firearms or drugs. At first, defendant and his 
passengers did not answer but stared straight ahead. Defendant 
then responded "no" (R. 141). At trial, defendant testified that 
he did not respond at first because he thought his brother might 
have had some controlled substances with him (R. 257). Further, 
defendant knew he had a hunting knife next to him in the vehicle. 
After initially denying that he had any weapons, defendant told 
the officer he had the knife (R. 263, 277). 
Deputy Walker asked defendant if he would mind if the 
vehicle was searched. Defendant responded that it would be 
"fine" (R. 141, 187, 217, 230, 257, 269, 277). Since the vehicle 
was in the traffic lane, the officer asked defendant to pull to 
the side of the road and exit the vehicle. Defendant and his 
passengers did (R. 141). Deputy Walker then entered the vehicle. 
Two other officers approached to assist. When 
defendant's brother was observed attempting to hide or reach for 
something in his pants, all three were patted-down for weapons 
(R. 218, 259). Drugs were found on the two passengers but not on 
defendant (R. 142, 159). 
Deputy Walker asked defendant if he had a key to the 
truck of the vehicle. Defendant got the key and opened the truck 
(R. 142-43, 218, 230-31, 258-59). Inside, a red tool box was 
observed. All three occupants were asked whose tool box it was. 
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No one claimed ownership (R. 160, 169, 219, 241). A key for the 
tool box was found in the truck and the box was opened. Inside, 
five baggies of marijuana were found along with a twenty dollar 
bill (R. 143, 220). Defendant was arrested (R. 143). 
Since defendant was too impaired to drive, the vehicle 
was impounded and taken to the Juab County Public Safety Building 
(R. 144, 161, 221). A subsequent inventory search revealed a 
methamphetamine "kit," containing used and unused packets of 
methamphetamine, a mirror and a razor, hidden under the console 
next to the driver's seat (R. 144, 222-24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While defendant challenged the search and seizure of 
the evidence in this case below, he did so on different grounds 
than those now raised on appeal. Having failed to argue his 
present constitutional claims to the trial court, defendant 
should be precluded from raising them for the first time on 
appeal. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying defendant's motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict 
in that the state presented sufficient evidence of each element 
of the crimes charged. 
The officers stated that no one claimed ownership. At trial, 
defendant and his brother testified that Hewlett said very softly 
that it was his but neither knew if the officers heard the 
comment (R. 269-271, 283). Hewlett never testified. 
•6-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THERE WAS 
"PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
DETAIN DEFENDANT AND [HIS] VEHICLE AFTER THE 
ROADBLOCK STOP." 
When defendant filed his motion to suppress in the 
trial court, he did so with only minimal reference to its basis 
(R. 25). During the subsequent pretrial evidentiary hearing on 
the motion, the parties presented testimony but no argument to 
the court (R. 135-191). Instead, defendant's counsel requested 
that memorandums be submitted (R. 190). On August 23, 1989, 
defendant filed his memorandum in support of the motion to 
suppress. In it, he argued three points: 
1. That the 1-15 roadblock did "not meet the standards 
of the Utah and Federal Constitution" in that it was conducted 
for "a period in excess of five hours" and "not all passenger 
vehicles were stopped" (R. 33); 
2. That "there was no articulable suspicion or reason 
to request permission to search the vehicle and, consequently, 
even if permission to search the vehicle were granted, the search 
is intrusive and a violation of Defendant's constitutional 
rights" (R. 33); and, 
3. That "a warrant should have been obtained to conduct 
further search of the vehicle, including the trunk area, after 
the arrest of the two passengers for having controlled substances 
on their persons" since "[t]here was absolutely no inference or 
reasonable cause to believe that there was more contraband in the 
trunk nor under the console of the vehicle" (R. 34). 
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In a written ruling, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion on the basis that the roadblock was conducted neutrally, 
by giving notice to the public, by posting warnings to 
approaching vehicles and by stopping all noncommercial vehicles. 
Further, the trial court found that defendant had voluntarily 
consented to the search of the vehicle (R. 49-56). 
At trial, defendant renewed his objection to the 
admission of the evidence seized from the vehicle on the grounds 
of "lack of foundation and lack of probable cause to search and 
seizure in the first place that is in the motion [to suppress]" 
(R. 248-49). The objection was overruled and the evidence 
admitted (R. 249). 
On appeal, defendant does not challenge any of the 
factual findings of the trial court. Nor does defendant 
challenge the trial court's legal conclusion regarding the 
4 
validity of the roadblock. While not challenged, it is 
noteworthy that similar type roadblocks have been upheld as 
constitutional. United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 
202 (10th Cir. 1990) (roadblock whose primary purpose was for 
checking driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of 
insurance does not violate the fourth amendment). Cf. Simmons v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 380 S.E.2d 656 (1989) (holding that 
the manner in which a driver's license/equipment roadblock was 
4 
In fact, defendant has done more than merely fail to challenge 
the validity of the roadblock. He has clearly elected to abandon 
this argument by eliminating from his appellate brief the 
roadblock argument contained in his trial memorandum. (Compare 
Point I of defendant's trial memorandum in support of the motion 
to suppress (R. 31-33), with Point I of his appellate brief at 5-
?•) 
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conducted violated the fourth amendment). See also Michigan 
Dept. of State Police v. Sitzf 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990) (sobriety 
checkpoint program does not violate the fourth amendment). 
Having elected not to proceed with his lower court 
challenge to the roadblock, defendant now argues that any 
detention of defendant beyond the primary purpose of the 
roadblock must be justified by "an articulable suspicion or 
probable cause" that defendant was involved in criminal activity 
(Br. of App. at 6-7). However, because defendant did not present 
this argument to the trial court as a ground for suppressing the 
evidence, he is precluded from raising it for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985).5 
The state recognizes the recent holdings that a constitutional 
issue may be considered for the first time on appeal if it 
impacts a defendant's liberty interest and involves plain error 
or exceptional circumstances. State v. Harqraves, 153 Utah Adv. 
Rep 33, 35 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1991); State v. Harrison, 152 
Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 24 n. 13 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991). In 
Harrison, this Court refused to consider a constitutional issue 
for the first time on appeal where there was no explanation or 
excuse for counsel's failure to raise the issue below. In 
Harqraves, a constitutional issue was considered for the first 
time on appeal when this Court found that because of intervening 
case law, exceptional circumstances existed justifying counsel's 
failure to raise the issue at trial. While a liberty interest 
was found in Harqraves but not in Harrison, it appears that this 
Court would still require that plain error or exceptional 
circumstances exist in conjunction with any liberty interest 
before considering constitutional issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. Compare Harqraves, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35 
(constitutional issue considered where liberty interest involved 
and exceptional circumstances exist), with State v. Webb, 790 
P.2d 65, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (fourth amendment issue not 
considered where issue was known and available to defendant in 
the lower court). Indeed, without such a requirement, the 
liberty interests inherent in any criminal proceeding would 
nullify the doctrine of waiver and procedural default. (See 
attached Addendum, excerpt from state's brief in State v. Donald 
Brown, Utah Sup. Ct. No. 900148, for a complete discussion of the 
inappropriateness of the liberty interest exception to waiver 
rules in criminal appeals). 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW THE ISSUE OF THE VOLUNTARINESS OF 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT. 
Similarly, defendant never raised below the issue of 
the voluntariness of his consent. Instead# defendant argued at 
trial that an officer must have an "articulable suspicion or 
reason to request permission to search" (R. 33). In other words, 
an officer must have a constitutional justification for 
requesting a defendant's consent to search. On appeal, defendant 
has again abandoned his lower court position to now argue that 
his consent was a result of "duress or coercion, express or 
implied" (Br. of App. at 8). For the reasons previously argued 
in Point I of this brief, defendant should be precluded from 
challenging the voluntariness of his consent for the first time 
on appeal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d at 660. 
The application of a procedural bar to defendant's 
argument is particularly appropriate considering defendant's 
concession of the issue below. During the suppression hearing, 
Deputy Walker testified that defendant consented to the search of 
the vehicle and its trunk (R. 141). Defendant's brother 
testified and acknowledged that defendant had freely consented to 
the search of both the vehicle and its trunk (R. 187). Defendant 
also testified at the hearing but never denied or otherwise 
challenged the consent (R. 180-83). The trial court in denying 
the motion to suppress concluded that the search was conducted 
pursuant to the voluntary consent of defendant (R. 50, 54). 
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Despite notice that the trial court had concluded that 
the consent was voluntary, defendant never challenged this 
pretrial conclusion. Instead at trial, defendant renewed his 
motion to suppress but only for the reasons stated originally, 
that is, the validity of the roadblock and that reasonable 
suspicion must exist to justify a reguest to search (R. 248-49). 
Additionally, when he testified at trial, defendant again stated 
that he had consented to the search (R. 257-58, 269). Thus, 
defendant not only failed to legally challenge the voluntariness 
of the consent but factually conceded that such had been given. 
Even on appeal, defendant has not articulated any basis 
to challenge the voluntariness of defendant's consent. Defendant 
only claims that the consent was coerced because the detention 
was allegedly unlawful, citing in support this Court's decisions 
in State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and State 
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Br. of App. at 7-
8). However, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
684 (Utah 1990), disagreed with both decisions' analysis of the 
consent issue. The current test in determining the validity of a 
consent obtained after initial police misconduct is "whether the 
consent was voluntary and whether the consent was obtained by 
police exploitation of the prior illegality." Id. at 688. Here, 
defendant has not argued that any nexus exists between the police 
conduct and defendant's consent. Instead, he merely claims that 
any prior unjustified detention automatically invalidates an 
otherwise voluntary consent. The Utah appellate courts have 
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recognized otherwise. Id. at 690; State v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 
431, 437-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).6 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS AND FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At the termination of the state's case-in-chief, 
defendant moved for dismissal, claiming that the state had failed 
to make out a prima facie case (R. 250). The motion was denied 
(R. 251). Defendant renewed the motion after both sides had 
rested by moving for a directed verdict of acquittal, claiming 
that there was an insufficient "nexus between the accused and the 
drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the power 
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug" 
(R. 288). Again, the motion was denied (R. 289-90). On appeal, 
defendant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying both motions. 
The same standard of review applies to a motion to 
dismiss based on insufficient evidence and a motion for directed 
verdict as to an insufficiency claim based on a jury verdict• In 
all three, the trial court's decision should be upheld "if, upon 
reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably 
drawn from it, [the appellate court] conclude[s] that some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
Since the trial court found no illegality in the police conduct 
in this case, no findings on the exploitation prong of Arroyo are 
necessary. Only if this Court were to find some prior police 
illegality, would it be appropriate to remand for further 
findings. Otherwise, since defendant conceded his consent below, 
the trial court's conclusion as to its voluntariness must stand. 
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elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the evidence presented in the state's case-in-
chief was that defendant was the driver and owner of a vehicle in 
which drugs were found (R. 215, 235). The marijuana was found in 
a locked tool chest in the locked trunk of the vehicle. A key to 
the tool box was found inside the trunk (R. 218-19). When the 
box was opened, five baggies of marijuana and a twenty dollar 
bill were found on top of the tools in the box. Testimony was 
presented that the marijuana was packaged in a manner common to 
its illegal distribution (R. 220). Additionally, the state 
presented evidence that methamphetamine and paraphernalia common 
to its usage were found hidden under the console next to and 
within reach of defendant (R. 223-24). While no direct evidence 
was presented that the drugs were defendant's, the circumstantial 
evidence and reasonable inferences established that nexus. 
Defendant had total control over the vehicle as its driver and 
owner. He had what was apparently the only key to the trunk 
where the marijuana was hidden. He had control over the key to 
the tool box because that too was hidden in the trunk. From the 
reluctance of defendant and his passengers to tell the police who 
owned the tool box, their knowledge of its illegal contents could 
be inferred. The methamphetamine was packaged for individual use 
and was sufficiently hidden under the console that it was only 
discovered during the inventory search. While one package of 
methamphetamine powder was found, two empty packets were in the 
same area indicating that the methamphetamine had, at some 
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previous time, been used in the vehicle. Based on the evidence, 
the trial court properly concluded that the state had presented a 
prima facie case that defendant had possession of the drugs. 
By the end of the trial, the evidence had gained in 
strength. While defendant and his brother testified that the 
drugs were not defendant's (R. 261, 272, 280), his brother was 
impeached with his prior statement that the drugs were 
defendant's. David Park had voluntarily told the police in the 
presence of Gerald Hewlett and defendant's mother that he 
was upset at Dan [defendant] because Dan 
owned the drugs and it was Dan that was 
involved with the drugs. He was upset th^t 
he and Gerald were taking the fall for him. 
We didn't have anything to do with it. It 
was [defendant's] drugs. 
(R. 284). As the trial court stated, this conflict in the 
evidence created a proper jury question (R. 290). 
Based on the evidence and its reasonable inferences, 
the was sufficient evidence presented to sustain defendant's 
convictions for possession of the drugs found in his vehicle. 
State v, Bingham, 732 P.2d 132 (Utah 1987); State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1985). 
-14-
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for 
possession of marijuana and methamphetamine should be affirmed. 
DATED this «ff#) day of March, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
Excerpt from State's brief, pages 7-11, filed February 
19, 1991, in State v. Donald Brown, Utah Sup. Ct. No. 900148: 
In response to a number of the issues raised by 
defendant in this appeal, the State argues that, because the 
issue was not raised in the trial court, it was not preserved for 
appeal and therefore should not be considered by this Court. The 
State cites case law from this Court that directly supports this 
position. However, a recent decision, State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 
798 (Utah 1990), has created some ambiguity concerning the 
application of well established waiver/procedural default rules, 
and has led to troublesome decisions from the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Therefore, because of its potential impact on the 
waiver arguments made in this brief, the State will first address 
the Jameson problem. 
In Jameson, an appeal from a probation revocation, the 
defendant argued that due to misconduct by the judge and the 
prosecutor, the constitutional prohibition against double 
jeopardy barred a second revocation hearing. Noting that this 
issue had been raised for the first time on appeal, a fact that 
would normally preclude review, the Court nevertheless considered 
itself obligated to address the defendant's argument "because it 
is based on a constitutional question and [the] defendant's 
liberty is at stake." 800 P.2d at 803. The Court did not 
explain this exception but simply cited to State v. Breckenridqe, 
688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983), and Pratt v. City Council of 
Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 1981). 
In Breckenridge, the Court addressed issues concerning 
the validity of the defendant's guilty plea, raised for the first 
time at oral argument before the Court, because "[t]he general 
rule that constitutional issues not raised at trial cannot be 
raised on appeal is excepted to when a person's liberty is at 
stake." 688 P.2d at 443 (citing Pratt, 639 P.2d at 173-74). The 
Court, explaining the liberty interest at stake, said that 
because •• Breckenridge's felony conviction and sentence rest on 
the outcome of his appeal," it would address the issue of the 
validity of his plea on a ground raised for the first time on 
appeal. Ibid. 
The difficulty with the liberty interest exception 
applied by the Breckenridge Court to a criminal case is that, for 
all practical purposes, in a criminal case the defendant's 
liberty is always at stake. That is, it is always true that the 
defendant's "conviction and sentence rest on the outcome of his 
[or her] appeal." Breckenridge, 688 P.2d at 443. Thus, on its 
face, the Breckenridge liberty interest exception, although not 
frequently argued by defendants on appeal or relied upon by the 
Court, effectively eliminates waiver as a ground for not 
considering an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has endeavored in two recent 
criminal cases to distinguish between issues where a liberty 
interest is at stake and those where that interest is not at 
stake. See State v. Harrison, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 24 n.13 
(Utah Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991) (no liberty interest at stake where 
issue concerned gender bias of prosecution's peremptory 
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challenges; thus, issue would not be considered for first time on 
appeal); State v, Hargraves, No, 890684-CA, slip op. at 5-6 
(Utah Ct. App. Feb- 7, 1991) (challenge to search would be 
considered for first time on appeal; "a liberty interest is 
involved because the search produced evidence critical to 
Hargraves's conviction and incarceration1'). The distinctions 
made in these two cases are at best questionable. Indeed, the 
court of appeals recognized difficulties inherent in applying the 
liberty interest exception in a criminal case. In Harrison, it 
wrote: 
We note a recent Utah Supreme Court 
opinion suggesting that when a constitutional 
question involving liberty is presented, the 
appellate court is "obliged" to consider it 
even though it was not raised in the trial 
court. State v. Jameson, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 5 (1990). This "obligation" has not been 
evident in previous cases where Utah's 
appellate courts have refused to entertain 
constitutional challenges to criminal 
convictions, with incarceration (and 
therefore liberty) at stake, when those 
challenges had not been raised below. We 
believe that "the interest of predictability, 
accountability, and fairness" would be served 
by a more careful examination of when Utah's 
appellate courts will consider issues not 
raised in the trial courts. We further 
believe that the previously enunciated 
standards allowing first-time appellate 
review of issues are sufficiently liberal to 
provide appropriate redress, and are 
therefore troubled by a standard requiring 
review whenever a "liberty" interest is 
identified. 
Slip op, at 14-15 n.13 (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
The State agrees with the gist of the court of appeals' 
observations in Harrison; the liberty interest exception is not 
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susceptible to predictable, consistent, and fair application in 
criminal cases, where the defendant's liberty interest is always 
at stake. If, in criminal cases, the waiver/procedural default 
rule is to continue as a viable basis for not reaching an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal, and if that rule is to be 
consistently and fairly applied, the Court should abandon any 
notion of a liberty interest exception and rely solely on the 
plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions to the 
waiver/procedural default rule when considering issues raised for 
the first time on appeal. The latter exceptions adequately and 
appropriately provide relief from waiver, without the inherent 
ambiguities associated with the liberty interest exception. 
Indeed, the Breckenridge case, the genesis of the liberty 
interest exception in criminal cases, could have just as easily 
been decided under the plain error rule. In short, abandoning 
the liberty interest exception will not prejudice a criminal 
defendant's right to full and fair consideration of issues that 
should be reviewed even though raised for the first time on 
appeal, and will guarantee a consistent application of the 
2 
Court's waiver/procedural default rule. See State v. Anderson, 
1
 See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah) (explaining 
plain error rule), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Jolivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989) (noting exceptional 
circumstances exception), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990). 
2 
The importance of consistent application of a state procedural 
default rule is illustrated in Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 
1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990). 
There, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear that the 
procedural default rule of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 
(1977), which bars federal habeas review when the state courts 
have declined to review an issue due to a procedural default by 
the defendant (e.g., failure to comply with a state 
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789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (where the Court appropriately 
applied the waiver/procedural default rule to a constitutional 
claim raised for the first time on appeal and concluded that the 
plain error rule was inapplicable). 
2 
Cont. contemporaneous objection rule), does not apply when the 
state procedural default rule has not been consistently applied. 
The existence of the Breckenridge liberty interest exception, 
which has already created an arguably inconsistent application of 
Utah's waiver/procedural default rule by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Harrison and Harqraves, invites wholesale federal 
habeas review of this Court's and the court of appeals' decisions 
that have disposed of federal questions on the basis of waiver. 
That sort of pervasive review of state court decisions is clearly 
undesirable, in that it undermines the state's weighty interest 
in the finality of criminal judgments. See Boggess v. Morris, 
635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981) (emphasizing that "integrity of the 
criminal justice system requires a finality of judgment that 
should limit repetitive appeals and collateral attacks" once the 
normal appellate process has concluded). 
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